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Abstract.  Disaster forensic investigation analyses the unfolding of a disaster and atempts to identify its 
multiple causes of damage which can lead to (i) improved disaster prevention and management from lessons 
learnt, and (i) more effective mitigation measures in the aftermath of a disaster. The way in which damage 
data are colected after a flood event as wel as the types of colected data influences their usability within 
forensic investigations. In order to explore whether or not existing data can be used for disaster forensic 
analysis, the European Project IDEA (Improving Damage assessments to Enhance cost-benefit Analyses) is 
investigating existing gaps in damage information so as to identify possible paths towards improving data 
quality. This paper focuses in detail on a forensic analysis of the interlinked damage to economic activities and 
infrastructure in the Severn floods of 2007 in the UK. Besides investigating the usability of existing data, this 
research investigated: (i) the relative weight of direct and indirect costs to business and infrastructure 
companies; (i) to what extent damage to infrastructure has impacted on indirect damage to businesses. Finaly 
recommendations for improving the data for use in forensic investigation are offered. 
1 Introduction 
Despite the increased understanding of the science of 
proved technology, the costs 
associated with these events are increasing at a rapid rate 
in both developed countries, where stronger technology 
and science have failed to stabilise losses, and in 
developing countries, where the increase in losses are 
growing much faster than wealth highlighting 
deficiencies in current research on disasters1. 
Many approaches to understanding disasters tend to 
be conducted within the frame of a narrow specialist field 
such as geological science, meteorology, technology, 
politics, economics or social sciences. Efforts rarely 
atempt to delve deeply into the underlying and cross-
disciplinary causes with the focus often on reacting to the 
disaster in order to recover, while the concept of 
 
In an atempt to address some of the deficiencies in 
current disaster research methodologies and improve the 
long-term recovery and prevention needed to reduce the 
impacts of such events, forensic investigation has been 
purposed as an alternative approach that offers a 
multidisciplinary framework. Forensic investigation aims 
to identify not only the physical vulnerabilities such as 
poor building standards and planning policies but also the 
major policy decisions and smaler incremental social and 
cultural  decisions  that  lead  to  accumulated  
vulnerabilities.1 
Another trait of forensic investigation is that the 
research must be carried out independently and free from 
influence from any external bodies while stil maintaining 
the authority and support of al public and private bodies 
involved and afected. This alows the investigation to 
achieve unadulterated results and report on the multitude 
of actions and responsibilities which account for the 
damage caused2. The aim of this type of investigation is 
not to pin blame on any one stakeholder but to expose the 
myriad of contributing factors and aid in the 
identification of the most efective responses in order to 
avoid a reoccurrence of the damage caused. 
One of the principles of forensic investigations is the 
ability to be able to accumulate evidence of good 
practices by examining the diferent impact of similar 
events in different locations or the effects of a single 
event on different sectors in the same geographical 
location. 
The participation of experts in a wide range of 
professional disciplines from natural sciences, social and 
economic studies, engineering, public health, emergency 
planners and humanitarian relief organisations is essential 
for an in-depth forensic investigation and input from as 
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 many stakeholders as possible wil lead to improved 
understanding of the causes and efects of damage and 
suitable mitigation measures to be implemented. 
However, a critical chalenge in forensic investigation 
is the way in which data are colected, analysed and 
shared among these stakeholders and how this data is also 
relayed to the forensic investigating team. A lack of data 
or inaccessibility can restrict the essential multi-
disciplinary insight that defines the approach. Where 
certain principle stakeholders are unwiling or unable to 
cooperate in the investigation the completeness of the 
results can be compromised. 
Reliability and completeness of data is crucial in 
being able to ascertain the reality of what occurred on the 
ground. When dealing with data that is colected during 
and in the aftermath of an event of high uncertainty, such 
as a natural disaster, this can often be difficult task to 
achieve. 
To explore whether or not existing data can be used 
for disaster forensic analyses, several case studies were 
analysed within the European Project IDEA (Improving 
Damage assessments to Enhance cost-benefit Analyses). 
The main objective was to investigate existing gaps in 
damage information so as to identify possible paths 
toward improvement of both data quality and procedures 
to colect and manage them. 
Assessing the reliability of damage data colection, 
storage and management for forensic investigations 
requires a deep understanding of the present state of art, 
as wel as of limits to be overcome and useful 
requirements to be supplied by tools developed by the 
IDEA project. 
This paper focuses in detail on the Severn flood in the 
UK in 2007. Folowing the severe flooding in 
Gloucestershire and elsewhere in 2007, the UK 
government commissioned Sir Michael Pit to examine 
the response and to provide lessons to be learned from 
that event. The Pit  Review 2007 made 92 
recommendations to the government including advice on 
improving data colection and recording. The report noted 
that effective information flows during the response and 
recovery periods are necessary. 
The focus of this case study is on identifying the 
vulnerabilities that lead to damage to commercial and 
industrial activities. In detail, observed direct and indirect 
damages are analysed according to a forensic approach. 
Particular care is taken to analyse indirect damage due to 
direct damage, as wel as damage to infrastructure, as it is 
often the case that business activities suffer because of 
disruption of essential services. It is through this process 
that the research aimed to understand the requirements 
for damage data in order to carry out a successful forensic 
analysis. 
Besides investigating the usability of existing data, 
this process alowed the exploration of: 
(i) what is the relative weight of direct and 
indirect costs to business and infrastructure 
companies; 
(i) to what extent damage to infrastructure 
has impacted on indirect damage to businesses. 
 
The methodological approach to the study is 
presented here before findings and results, with their 
implications for forensic analysis and data, are discussed. 
Finaly a selected number of recovery interventions for 
the business sector and utilities were analysed to assess to 
what extent the forensic investigation has been used or 
may be used to guarantee efective investments. 
2 Methodology 
The methodological approach entailed firstly the 
colection and analysis of existing data obtained from 
reports, databases and directly from stakeholders. 
This was folowed by carrying out a forensic analysis 
of the Severn floods of 2007 which was considered a 
suitable case study due to the extensive coverage and 
post-disaster analysis carried out at al levels. 
Finaly the results from the forensic analysis were 
assessed for their accuracy and applicability which led to 
a judgement of the quality of the data used to carry out 
the forensic analysis. 
2.1 Data colection and analysis 
2.1.1 Stakeholder identification and categorisation 
A review of event reports and literature alowed first 
to identify principle stakeholders. A questionnaire was 
then sent to individual stakeholders so that profiles were 
created for each stakeholder, based on questionnaires 
results. Preliminary information was further integrated 
with knowledge acquired by direct interviews arranged 
with engaged stakeholders. Interestingly, further 
stakeholders were identified through such discussions. 
This was folowed by engagement with stakeholders 
and the categorisation of these into data owners, users or 
colectors. Stakeholders were also categorised as public 
or private organisations, with public groups relating to 
policy level government bodies, county councils, district 
councils and emergency services. Private stakeholders 
included insurance companies, service providers such as 
water companies, electricity providers, gas and 
telecommunications companies, private businesses and 
voluntary organisations. 
As regard data owners, characterisation implied the 
identification of (i) which data they are responsible for, 
(i) at which spatial and temporal scales, (ii) with what 
rights (e.g. private or public owners, voluntarily or by 
law, etc.) and (iv) tools used for the storage of data. With 
respect to data colectors, investigation concerned (i) 
reasons for data colection, (i) type of colected data and 
spatial and temporal scales of interest (ii) tools and 
procedures presently implemented, and (iv) available 
human and economic resources. Data users were 
characterised in terms of (i) data of interest, (i) scales of 
interest and (ii) uses of data. 
Moreover links among the different stakeholders were 
identified as some data are colected or owned by certain 
stakeholders who shared them with other stakeholders for 
the different purposes related to risk management. 
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 Finaly, stakeholders that are/could be in charge of 
coordinating the data analysis and representation were 
defined. Previous experience has shown that without such 
entity taking care of integrating the data no 
comprehensive picture of disaster impacts wil be ever 
possible 
2.1.2 Data gathering 
2.1.3 Data analysis 
An assessment of the comprehensiveness of the 
colected data was performed. In detail, availability of 
data to depict the ful range of likely impacts as wel as 
their drivers (i.e. hazard, exposure and vulnerability 
factors) was assessed. Finaly, a categorisation of main 
data sources was carried out based on format and level of 
detail in order to make the use of this data more suitable 
for the scale of forensic analysis desired. 
2.2 Forensic analysis 
 In the process of forensic analysis it is important to 
understand the ultimate goal of carrying out such 
investigations. In the case of disaster vulnerability 
analysis we may, for example, aim to assess the impact of 
varying diferent factors on diferent sectors of the 
exposed community. In order to be able to cary out a 
variety of analyses, it is essential to quantify as many 
values and variants as possible. 
In this particular case, it was extremely valuable to 
gain insight into how particular sectors were afected in 
diferent ways by varying vulnerability factors in order to 
establish the most beneficial actions to take in building 
resilience.  This section explains how to arrive at the 
point where this is possible. 
The forensic analysis began with the creation of a 
timeline of events as they unfolded, beginning with the 
first evidence of heavy rainfal. The entire event unfolded 
over quite a long period and emergency operations and 
other actions took place outside of the research area and 
also unrelated to infrastructure and business. These 
events were considered to be outside the limits of this 
study. 
 
It was deemed necessary to treat each individual 
element and sector of the infrastructure network 
separately by carrying out individual forensic 
investigations for each in order to firstly establish the 
direct impact, and then take an overarching approach to 
how direct impact to each of these sectors indirectly 
impacted on businesses. This decision was taken due to 
the complexity of the infrastructure network and the 
interrelations within the system. 
 
From the timeline an extensive list of the perceived 
contributing factors was created. This included such 
aspects as the suitability of emergency response plans in 
place before the flood and the times of flood warnings. 
Folowing this, the factors were categorised depending on 
whether they were considered to be related to the hazard 
or to physical, social, organisational or systemic 
vulnerability. Some factors fel into several of these 
categories simultaneously and the categorisation reflected 
this. This process is ilustrated in Table 1 below. 
Folowing this a judgement was made as to whether 
these factors contributed to or reduced damage or both. 
This is relevant in that some factors were a combination 
of both. For example, the shuting down of a water 
treatment plant protected the machinery of the plant and 
sets and reduced long term 
damage but it had an impact on businesses and residences 
in the short term. 
 
This exercise built up a strong picture of where the 
largest vulnerabilities lay. For example, the majority of 
contributing factors may lie in the organisational 
vulnerability of a company or agency. This is to say that 
emergency planning, management and decision making 
would be the primary contributing factors in causing 
damage. Additionaly systemic issues may be prevalent in 
the causing of damage as the failure of a single element 
of an infrastructure system can result in large-scale 
impact. 
 
Folowing this step, an estimated weight was assigned 
to the direct impact of each factor on the main affected 
sector. In order to do this, firstly a judgement was made 
on which sectors were afected. For example, this could 
include businesses, residences, infrastructure companies, 
emergency operations, government agencies etc. Once 
the affected sectors are decided on, a decision is made on 
which sector was affected by each factor. This is done by 
Table 2 below. In this case it is clear that the hazard 
afected al sectors while the large amount of information 
to deal with afects mostly emergency services and the 
Environment Agency.
The next step in the process was to make a judgement 
of the weight of the impact on each sector for each factor. 
This is done on a scale of 1-3 with 1 being minimal, 2 
being significant and 3 being major. 
A value of -1,-2 or -3 may be assigned to factors if it 
is believed that these factors contributed more to a 
reduction of vulnerability than to an increase. The 
importance of a negative value is revealed in the 
folowing step when values are accumulated and thus 
reflect on the overal weight of contributing factors 
whether they reduce or contribute to damage. The value 
of this is clear where one particular factor may both
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Table 1 Forensic analysis listing contributing factors assigned to vulnerability class 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2 Assigning of impact to afected sectors 
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Table 3 Assigning of weight to impact on afected sectors. Total is calculated by summing weights across al sectors. 
 
 
  
Table 4 Total weight of factor is substituted back into vulnerabilities columns in order to calculate 
total significance for each vulnerability. 
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Table 5 Total weight of each vulnerability calculated by summing accumulated impact. 
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reduce and contribute to damage for varying sectors. This 
is shown in Table 3. 
In order to be able to analyse the real weight of 
factors of vulnerability and be able to comment on the 
varying degrees of relevance for diferent sectors it was 
essential to be able to apply values to the importance of 
each factor. In order to do this, informed judgements 
were made and there was an element of subjectivity. 
Statisticaly speaking, by combining the sums of various 
subjective values, any discrepancies are aggregated and 
cancel each other out. A cumulative approach is thus 
beneficial. So the next step is a return to the previous 
section where the above weighted values are added 
together and input into the vulnerabilities columns as 
shown in Table 4. This gives a cumulative number of the 
impact of each vulnerability factor based on comparable 
parameters.3 This then alowed for the calculation of the 
total impact of each vulnerability in order to establish 
which is the most critical as shown in Table 5. 
Having carried out this exercise for each individual 
element or sector of the infrastructure network, the 
factors that were judged to have had an indirect impact on 
businesses were then translated into the forensic analysis 
of the business sector and the same process then carried 
out again. This narrows the field of analysis and alows 
for the assessment of importance of factors based on their 
perceived impact. Similar analysis can then be carried out 
ofering insight into the categories of vulnerabilities. 
3 Infrastructure and business 
As part of the IDEA project this paper focuses 
specificaly on the indirect impact of infrastructure failure 
on businesses in the 2007 Severn Trent floods in the 
U.K. 
In a report produced as part of the FloodProBE 
project,4 critical infrastructure is defined as that 
infrastructure which is essential for the functioning of 
society, whose failure would seriously affect many 
people. The report ofers an assessment of the 
vulnerability to infrastructure which includes an analysis 
of the effects of element failure on a network. The 
-
efects of infrastructure failure and the inter-dependency 
of infrastructures. In fact the study focuses more on these 
secondary impacts than on the direct impacts and offers a 
relevant analysis of the vulnerability of infrastructure and 
its impact on businesses. 
Rapid recovery of businesses may be hampered more 
by the loss of critical infrastructure than by direct 
physical damage. Tierney5 found businesses were forced 
to close by disruption to utility services more often than 
by direct damage during 1993 flooding in the U.S. 
Midwest. 15% of Des Moines businesses experienced 
flood damage while 42% were forced to close due to lack 
of regular services such as electricity or water. If a 
business itself is not directly impacted by a disaster, 
damage to ofsite lifelines wil stil have a negative 
impact on recovery. 
In a regional context, the most important elements are 
electricity, water supply, wastewater drainage systems, 
transportation, and communication systems. Welfare and 
social systems such as food distribution centres and 
financial centres as wel as emergency services are also of 
importance for the functioning of normal services during 
a flood event6. In order to quantify the impacts on society 
it is important to assess the duration of disruption, the 
area affected, the number of people affected and 
combinations of these, having first analysed the effect of 
element failure on the network and then the effect of this 
on other networks. 
Similar problems are faced by businesses subjected to 
disruption of the road transport system due to the damage 
to primary roads which may be closed for some time. 
Organisations, businesses and infrastructure systems 
can be considered as networks consisting of various 
actors and information flow. Studies of networks 
demonstrate that networks consisting of a few key nodes, 
or hubs, and high connectivity between them, folowed 
by an increasing number of other nodes with decreasing 
connectivity are less vulnerable to failure due to a 
deletion of nodes or breaking of links7. Because external 
shocks to the network can happen at random the 
likelihood that a peripheral hub would be affected is 
smal and the network wil not lose its connectedness. 
However, many networks can have a weakness in that 
they are vulnerable to a shock that afects the most highly 
connected hubs. The Internet is one example of this in 
that internet traffic is rarely disrupted by disruptions to 
smaler servers but can be extremely disrupted by a 
failure of a few key hubs8. Such perspectives suggest that 
the more reliant a business is on the satisfactory operation 
of infrastructure, the more vulnerable it wil be to the 
impacts of climate related incidents such as flooding. 
Table 6 below shows a diagramatic example of how 
infrastructures relate to each other and how other sectors 
rely on the functioning of the system. 
 
 
 
4 The Severn Trent Floods 
 This particular case study focuses on the 
Gloucestershire area of the U.K. which has experienced 
severe flooding in recent years, most notably in 2007 
which resulted in the largest emergency operation in the 
U.K since World War II. In June and July 2007 more 
than 55,000 properties were flooded, 7,000 people had to 
Table 6 Interdependancies within infrastructure system and 
with other sectors. 
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 be rescued and 13 people died. Nearly 500,000 people 
were  left  without  water  or  electricity  and  
the  bil was expected to be more than £3 
bilion. 
4.1 Infrastructure 
During the flooding of 2007, infrastructure in the 
Gloucestershire area was heavily impacted with the 
closure of the Mythe Water Treatment plant leaving 
350,000 people without drinking water for up to 16 days, 
an estimated 10,000 people stranded on the M5 
motorway and 42,000 people left without power when a 
controled shutdown of the Castlemeads Power Station 
was carried out being just a handful of examples of 
widespread damages to infrastructure. As previously 
outlined in Section 3, direct impacts to infrastructure can 
lead to indirect impacts to business and this forensic 
analysis aimed to identify and quantify these impacts and 
their root causes.  
In a regional context as is the case in Gloucestershire, 
the most important elements are electricity, water supply, 
wastewater drainage systems, transportation, and 
communication systems. Welfare and social systems such 
as food distribution centres and financial centres as wel 
as emergency services are also of importance for the 
functioning of normal services during a flood event. 
Due  to  the  complex  interdependencies  of  
infrastructure networks, with many elements relying on 
the operation of one or many others, it is difficult to 
equate the impact the failure of one element has on a 
region or the businesses in that region. 
For this reason it was important to carry out forensic 
investigations for each sector of infrastructure in order to 
establish any indirect impacts that occurred between 
diferent infrastructures. 
4.1.1 Water 
Water treatment plants represent a critical 
infrastructure in their provisions of healthy drinking 
water to a large number of people across the country. In 
the case of the flooding in Gloucestershire, this is the 
service that was most disrupted and which consequently 
had the biggest impact on the businesses and public as a 
whole. As a particularly clear and poignant example, the 
failure of the Mythe water treatment plant owned by 
Severn Trent Water (STW), resulted in loss of drinkable 
water to over 350,000 people for up to 16 days. This 
extreme incident was coupled with widespread minor 
incidents and damage to other assets such as the sewerage 
system and other smaler pumps. Severn Trent Water 
estimate the total cost to the company due to direct 
damage to be in the region of £25 milion and £35 
milion. 
infrastructure was carried out as outlined in Section 2.2 
and the folowing results emerged. 
 Figure 1 
 
The most significant vulnerability that resulted in 
damage was systemic vulnerability due to the fact that 
many people in the area were reliant on a single source of 
drinking water. In addition to this, the treatment plant 
was unable to draw on other source of water and 
reservoirs.  
Systemic vulnerability was folowed by organisational 
vulnerability in terms of significance. The range of 
organisational factors was not confined to just those of 
the plant management but also to decisions made about 
emergency management and flood defences.  One of the 
most significant factors was the inadequacy of the 
emergency plan for the plant that was in place prior to the 
flood in dealing with the scale and extent of the flooding. 
Physical and social vulnerabilities are the least significant 
of the identified  vulnerabilities. The physical  
vulnerability in this case was minimal mainly due to 
some decisions such as the one to shut down the water 
treatment plant helped to reduce the overal impact of the 
flooding. Social vulnerabilities were less significant due 
to the isolated and technical nature of infrastructure. In 
this case social aspects became involved mostly in the 
emergency operation and provision of water to 
customers. Although significant in their own right, they 
contribute less to damage than the others 
Folowing these vulnerabilities was the hazard itself. 
Without the flood there would be no flood damage. In 
this sense, the hazard, although amplified by certain 
factors, is unavoidable from the perspective of the water 
company. 
. 
In terms of the most significant individual factors, the 
list below ilustrates the contributing weight of each. It is 
worth noting that the weighted factor considers both 
contributing and reducing factors. For this reason the 
shuting down of the plant, although it affected many 
people in the short term, reduced the long term damage 
that would have resulted if essential equipment was 
damaged. 
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Table 7 List of most significant contributing factors 
afecting Severn Trent Water 
 
The sectors that were most affected indirectly by the 
damages to the water infrastructure were residences, 
businesses, other infrastructure, emergency services and 
government agencies such as the EA and district 
councils. The graph below ilustrates the weight of the 
impacts on each sector with residents and businesses 
being the most impacted. 
 
 Figure 2 
 
4.1.2 Roads and Transport 
 
As a result of the flooding the roads and transport 
network was seriously disrupted. Motorists and public 
transport users found themselves stranded as the transport 
network struggled to cope with the conditions  an 
estimated 10,000 motorists were stranded overnight on 
the M5 between junctions 10 and 12 and on some other 
roads, and approximately 500 people were stranded at 
Gloucester Railway Station as the railway network failed. 
Rest centres were established in Moreton-in-Marsh, 
Chipping Campden, Gloucester, Cheltenham, and 
Tewkesbury to help people that could not get home. 
These rest centres colectively accommodated around 
2000 people at the height of the emergency.9 
The forensic analysis of the network revealed the 
folowing results. 
 
 Figure 3 
 
As can be seen, the most significant vulnerability is 
the physical characteristic of the system. This relates 
mostly to the deterioration of assets on the network, 
physical damage to roads, a lack of maintenance, 
restricted access caused by water on the roads, congestion 
and the resulting difficulties for emergency operations 
that resulted from congestion. 
 
As was the case in the water network, the hazard is 
again significant but since it is out of the control of the 
infrastructure sector and therefore must be considered 
separately to the other vulnerabilities. 
 
Systemic vulnerabilities were the next most 
significant aspect for the transport network with 
restrictions in the network that lead to congestion. It was 
noted that improved use of secondary roads and dual-lane 
motorways would have led to fewer disruptions. The rail 
network by its nature is quite susceptible to systemic 
vulnerabilities and was affected greatly. 
 
Organisational vulnerability is the next most 
significant vulnerability and relates to decisions taken 
within the sector that lead to disruptions such as the 
ineficiency in the communication of information to 
motorists, cooperation with local authorities and 
emergency services which were hindered by a lack of 
understanding due to communication issues and 
ineficiencies in emergency plans in dealing with an 
event of such a scale. However, actions to provide 
support for those stranded on roads and railways were 
overal quite effective. 
 
of knowledge about how to react in such events were less 
significant but nonetheless did exist. 
In terms of the most significant individual factors, the 
list below ilustrates the contributing weight of each. It is 
worth noting that the weighted factor considers both 
contributing and reducing factors. For this reason, while 
access to emergency supplies for example, was restricted, 
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 the network in general operated wel and resulted in very 
few threats to life. The biggest impact was to the normal 
operation of businesses and daily life. 
 
  
Table 8 List of contributing factors afecting roads and 
transport network 
 
As shown in Figure 4 the sectors most afected by 
direct damage to the transport network were 
residents/motorists and emergency services, folowed by 
businesses and public agencies. This is in contrast with 
the water network which afected businesses most. 
 
 Figure 4 
 
4.1.3 Electricity 
 
Impacts to the electricity supply network were also 
widespread. However, less information was available 
regarding the factors and impacts as were available for 
the water and transport networks. However a forensic 
analysis was stil able to be carried out. 
During the flood event in the summer of 2007 there 
was a high risk that the Walham electricity sub-station, 
which serves Gloucestershire and parts of Wales and 
Herefordshire, could be flooded leading to electricity 
failure. Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Service led the 
eforts to save Walham from flooding, caling in flood 
defence barriers and additional pumping equipment. The 
massive operation continued on 23rd July to prevent 
serious flooding at Walham sub-station up until the 
predicted high tide at 3am. The flood defences withstood 
the high tide and the immediate threat of loss of 
electricity passed. 
However, at the Castlemeads electricity sub-station, 
operated by Central Networks, the situation had 
deteriorated and surge water had overwhelmed the 
pumps. This led to a controled switch off of power, 
initialy leaving about 42,000 people in Gloucester 
without power. By the end of the day the number of 
homes without power was reduced to 1,800. 
The most significant vulnerabilities aside from the 
hazard were organisational and physical vulnerability 
folowed by systemic vulnerabilities. 
 
 Figure 5 
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 The physical vulnerability of assets on the network to 
flooding is a major area of concern for the electricity 
supply companies who spend a large amount of time and 
money maintaining these during normal operational 
periods. In times of crisis this maintenance is much more 
resource intensive and some assets were either damaged 
or, shut down in order to avoid damage. The nature of 
electrical equipment makes it very susceptible to damage 
from flooding 
Organisational decisions made during the emergency 
lead to large impacts. The decision to take the 
Castlemeads power station of line may have saved 
potential long-term damage but it afected several 
thousand customers and resulted in large costs to the 
company and disruption to operations. 
Somewhat surprisingly, this analysis reveals that 
systemic vulnerabilities are not as significant as others. 
This may be down to a lack of evidence or information 
but it is clear that it is significant. Perhaps systemic 
resilience resulted in comparatively smal impacts 
compared to the closure of the water treatment plant for 
example. 
In terms of the most significant individual factors, the 
list below ilustrates the contributing weight of each. It is 
worth noting that the weighted factor considers both 
contributing and reducing factors. 
 
Table 9 List of contributing factors afecting electricity network 
As shown in Figure 6 the sectors most afected by 
direct damage to the electricity supply network were both 
the residents and businesses equaly with other 
infrastructures, emergency costs and public agencies. 
 
Figure 6 
4.2 Business 
Having carried out forensic investigations for each of 
the previously outlined infrastructure sectors, the factors 
that affected businesses indirectly were translated to a 
forensic investigation of the business sector. These 
factors were categorised as indirect factors while direct 
factors were added which were not related to 
infrastructure. From this point a similar process was 
folowed as for the infrastructure sectors. The aim of the 
forensic investigation for businesses was to compare and 
contrast the effect of direct and indirect vulnerabilities. 
 
4.2.1 Indirect damages 
 
Having accumulated and analysed the impact of 
indirect damages to businesses caused by direct damage 
to infrastructure it can be seen that organisational 
vulnerabilities contributed more to damage than any 
other. 
 
 Figure 7 
 
Organisational vulnerabilities of infrastructure refer to 
the decisions taken by management in the infrastructure 
companies that lead to increased impact on businesses. 
These decisions include the decision to shut the water 
treatment plant and the electricity supply plant for 
example. In relation to roads and transport they relate to 
the lack of communication to motorists about what to do 
in emergency situations. 
Physical vulnerabilities were the second most 
significant for businesses. This includes the location of 
the water treatment plants and the power supply plants 
and roads which were al in physicaly vulnerable 
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 locations. Also the nature of the emergency was 
particularly hazardous for both electricity and water 
treatment as water can be disastrous for both. 
Folowing physical vulnerability is systemic 
vulnerability which in infrastructure relates to reliance on 
one single element of a system which exposes end users 
to the risk of losing service in the case of that one 
element being damaged or isolated. In this case each of 
the infrastructure networks experienced this. 
Social vulnerabilities include such factors as the 
misuse of water tanks that were provided by the water 
company once the water treatment plant had been shut 
down. This resulted in loss of water and damage to 
equipment. Additionaly, the increased use of water once 
the closure was announced as imminent afected 
emergency supplies. It also refers to the ability of 
businesses to respond to the indirect damages as many 
had no previous experience of flooding of this scale and 
emergency services were overwhelmed. The fact that 
many customers were lost due to being occupied with 
managing their own situations affected business as did 
the fact that many thought that particular towns were 
flooded and avoided shopping there for some time after 
they were cleared. 
Economic vulnerabilities refer to the impact that 
reduced custom had on business as people were occupied 
with dealing with the emergency. 
 
4.2.2 Direct damages 
 
Direct damages are those that directly affected 
businesses such as the flooding of premises, loss of stock, 
closure of business due to flooding, and relocation costs. 
 
 Figure 8 
When it comes to direct vulnerabilities physical 
vulnerability is again the most significant. This relates 
mostly to flooding of properties and development of 
floodplains which led to properties being located in high 
flood risk areas. 
Organisational vulnerabilities are the second most 
significant vulnerability and include the lack of 
knowledge  with  regard  to  recovery  methods.  
Additionaly, many businesses were not prepared for 
flooding and did not have business continuity plans or 
emergency action plans in place which led to increased 
damage and longer recovery times. 
In contrast to indirect damages, economic 
vulnerabilities are more significant. This relates to the 
cost of repairs and recovery and to difficulties in 
accessing insurance and public funding. 
Again in contrast to direct damage, systemic 
vulnerability is less significant. This is due to the nature 
of business in comparison with the nature of 
infrastructure networks which depend on many individual 
elements of the system to operate functionaly I order to 
maintain constant supply of services. 
4.3 Conclusions of forensic analysis 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this in-depth 
analysis. Firstly, the clearest diference between indirect 
and direct vulnerabilities is the increased significance of 
economic factors. Businesses are reliant on cash flow and 
continuity of business in order to minimise damages. Not 
only does damage to stock and premises have an 
economic impact, so too does the loss of custom. 
However, the difficulty in accessing insurance and public 
funding and the problems related to identifying direct and 
indirect costs due to flooding mean that the economic 
vulnerabilities can leave businesses struggling for a long 
time after a flood. 
Secondly, systemic vulnerabilities, while extremely 
significant for infrastructure and indirect impacts, are less 
so for businesses themselves. This means that 
improvements in the systemic resilience of networks 
would benefit businesses more than increasing the 
systemic resilience of businesses. 
5 Findings 
5.1 Assessment of forensic investigation 
The forensic investigation methodology developed is 
very useful in identifying the root causes of damage, 
direct and indirect. Comparisons can be made between 
diferent sectors and how they are impacted in different 
ways. Also, this methodology alows us to assign 
contributing weights to the diferent sectors of the 
infrastructure network. 
The methodology gives a comprehensive overview of 
the reality of the situation by drawing together factors 
from a wide range of perspectives thus iluminating areas 
that are often overlooked when it comes to damage 
impact analysis. The multi-disciplinary approach covers 
areas that relate to social, physical, organisational, 
economic and systemic aspects of vulnerabilities. This is 
very beneficial in identifying the best area for investment 
of funds and mitigation measures. 
However, it is clear from the case study approach that 
any forensic analysis is only as good as the data that is 
used.  In this case it was dificult to access primary data 
that would alow for more in-depth analysis, in particular 
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 with regard to the actual impact on businesses. While 
some figures can be found that refer to national estimates 
and some local statistics, without comprehensive 
knowledge of a further dataset, actual impacts must be 
assumed. This reduces the validity of the findings. 
Secondly, the weights assigned to factors are assigned 
based on informed judgement and are subjective. An 
atempt is made to address this by using controled 
parameters but often it is left open to the judgement of 
the investigator. 
5.2 Data requirements for forensic investigation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Range of data needed for forensic analysis 
 in relation to businesses 
 
Figure 10 Categories of data and agency responsible 
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 5.2.1 Sources of data 
 
5.2.2 Categories of data 
 
5.2.3 Scales of data 
 
6 Conclusions 
Forensic disaster investigations offer a valuable tool 
that offers unique insight into the root causes of disaster 
damage. This methodology brings together expert 
knowledge from a wide range of disciplines and casts a 
comprehensive view over political, social, economic, 
structural, physical and systemic vulnerabilities that is 
innovative and extremely useful in improving the 
targeting of mitigating measures that can build overal 
resilience. 
This approach is very beneficial in an area where 
perspectives are often limited and isolated within 
particular fields of expertise and where investment can be 
fragmented and ineficient. The aim of such a forensic 
approach is to improve the cost-benefit of limited 
resources in tackling the underlying issues that often 
result in widespread damages during hazard events. 
However, this approach is limited by the quantity and 
quality of data available and suitable data can only be 
relied upon if it is being colected at the right time and 
with the correct parameters. Quality control of data starts 
at colection and continues through storage, analysis and 
sharing. Efective colaboration across al agencies and 
bodies involved in data colection is a key factor in 
assuring reliable and useable data for forensic analysis. 
 Timeliness of colection can significantly affect the 
quality and usability of data. With many organisations 
reporting on the difficulties of geting staff to cut-off 
areas during flooding, much data is not colected at the 
most appropriate time, when the flood waters are at their 
highest. Additionaly, continuous monitoring after the 
event to establish recovery and drying out times etc. 
would greatly improve the ability to estimate actual 
damage and impact. 
The importance of a common platform for data 
sharing as wel as of shared procedures for data colection 
(that envisages also the integration of present missing 
information) has then been identified as a key objective 
for the IDEA project. 
Ultimately, judgements must be made regarding the 
reliability of any data used and this is in the hands of 
investigating team and ultimate responsibility lies with 
them. 
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